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Service: Proposing an
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Civil Procedure
Introduction
Considerable confusion exists over how American parties should serve
foreign defendants in litigation brought before state and federal courts,
particularly in the context of service by mail. The federal or state
("domestic") rules permitting service abroad by mail and the Hague
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Docu-
ments in Civil or Commercial Matters (hereinafter the Hague Service
Convention or Convention) frequently send mixed signals to American
courts and practitioners.' On the one hand, Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 4(i) and state rules of civil procedure frequently permit direct ser-
vice by mail to foreign parties without any limitation. 2 On the other
hand, the Hague Service Convention prohibits either all service by mail
or prohibits such service when a signatory nation expressly objects to
this method.3
A conflict exists among federal courts about how to reconcile incon-
gruous aspects of domestic service provisions and the Hague Service
Convention. Citing the mandatory language of Article 1 of the Conven-
tion, some courts have concluded that the Convention is the exclusive
mechanism for serving abroad. Other courts, however, have treated the
Convention as a permissive supplement, merely intended tofacilitate fair
and effective service. Given the precipitous increase in litigation involv-
ing foreign parties in American courts fueled by the rise in international
travel, commerce, and industry,4 it is important to resolve this conflict.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 12-8 1.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 12-37.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 38-71.
4. The need to address international litigation has been recognized for over
three decades. When Congress considered creating a commission in 1958 to study
present international judicial assistance (i.e., how foreign countries facilitate the reso-
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This Note attempts to resolve the confusion in federal courts by propos-
ing an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to clarify the
circumstances under which the Hague Service Convention supersedes
domestic service provisions.
Part One of this Note traces the development of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(i) ("FRCP 4(i)") and the Hague Service Convention,
finding that a conflict exists between the language of domestic service
provisions and the Convention, particularly in the context of service by
mail. 5
Part Two examines conflicting judicial attempts at reconciling the
language of domestic service provisions and the Convention, and
presents three observations. First, the cases foster confusion by articu-
lating two very different approaches. 6 Second, none of the judicial reso-
lutions satisfy basic principles of American civil procedure law.7 Finally,
and perhaps most important, neither of these approaches adequately
satisfies the Convention's goal of facilitating international litigation in
the spirit of international cooperation. 8
Part Two further contends that the mandatory language of the Con-
vention must not be read in a vacuum, but in conjunction with the objec-
tives of the Convention. Although the language and drafting history of
the Convention suggest that it is mandatory, the stated purpose of the
Convention-to facilitate the completion of international litigation in
the spirit of international judicial cooperation-suggests that the Con-
vention would permit other methods of service where compliance with
the Convention would not effect service and would thereby deprive
plaintiff of the ability to sue.
Thus, Part Three concludes that the Convention language, read in
conjunction with its purpose, should be interpreted to prescribe a "rule
of first resort,"9 an approach adopted by the concurrence in Societi
Nationale v. U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D. Iowa,' 0 to deal with a related conflict
between domestic discovery rules and the Hague Evidence Convention.
lution of international litigation) and to recommend procedural improvements, the
SenateJudiciary Committee noted that "[t]he extensive increase in the international,
commercial and financial transactions involving both individuals and governments
and the resultant disputes, leading sometimes to litigation, has pointedly demon-
strated the need and desirability for a comprehensive study of the extent to which
international judicial assistance can be obtained." S. REP. No. 2392, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5201, 5202-03.
Similarly, in the hearings preceding ratification of the Hague Service Convention, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee observed that "the continually increasing vol-
ume of American travel abroad, especially in Europe, of international business trans-
actions, of U.S. investment abroad, the subject of insuring that U.S. citizens who were
sued in foreign courts received notice.., is a matter of substantial importance to this
country." S. ExEC. REP. No. 6, 90th Congress, 1st Sess. 6 (1967).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 12-81.
6. See inf a text accompanying notes 124-31.
7. See ini'a text accompanying notes 132-42.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 143-58.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 159-204.
10. 107 S.Ct. 2542 (1987).
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Under this rule of first resort, the plaintiff first must attempt to serve
under the Hague Service Convention before employing more permissive
domestic service provisions. This approach best resolves the interplay
between domestic rules and the Hague Service Convention while at the
same time maintaining United States respect for its treaty obligations.
Part Four of this Note proposes an amendment to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to clarify the meaning of the Convention. The pro-
posed amendment requires resort to the Convention unless effecting
service under the Convention is objectively impossible.I l
I. Service of Process Provisions
A. FRCP 4(i)
1. History, Development and Purpose of FRCP 4(i)
FRCP 4 prescribes the adequacy and manner of service of process in
United States federal courts by stipulating when a party has authority to
serve12 and what methods that party may employ to effect service.
1 3
FRCP 4(i), promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1963,14 provides
alternative methods for serving foreign parties. 15 Its alternative meth-
ods of service provide flexibility in an era of escalating international liti-
gation and ensure that foreign courts will enforce American judgments
against foreign parties.
FRCP 4(i) was part of a comprehensive plan to adapt federal law to
the increasing need for international judicial cooperation: "The exten-
sive increase in international, commercial and financial transactions
involving both individuals and governments and the resultant disputes,
leading sometimes to litigation, has pointedly demonstrated the need
and desirability for a comprehensive study of the extent to which inter-
national judicial assistance can be obtained."' 16 Escalating United States
involvement in overseas investments, international travel, and trade or
aid programs abroad prompted Congress to establish the Commission
on International Rules of Judicial Procedure in 1958.17 After finding
11. See infra text accompanying notes 205-11.
12. Generally, parties may serve a summons or complaint "anywhere within the
territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held." FED. R. Cixv. P. 4(f).
A party may, however, serve beyond the territorial boundaries of a state if the Federal
Rules, a state statute or a federal statute provides authorization. Id.
13. Generally, any person who is over 18 years of age and not a party to the
litigation may serve a summons or complaint. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). A party
may also serve the defendant by mail or through other methods prescribed by the law
of the state where the district court is located. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i) and 4(e).
14. Amram, The Proposed International Comention on the Service of Documents Abroad,
51 A.B.A.J. 650, 650 (1965).
15. It is important to note that Rule 4(i) provides alternative methods of service. A
party still may effect service upon a foreign defendant in the manner provided by a
state statute. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
16. S. REP. No. 2392, supra note 4, at 3, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 5202-03.
17. Id. at 3, reprinted hi 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5202.
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"existing means for serving judicial documents abroad . . . to be cum-
bersome or insufficient,"' 18 Congress empowered the Commission to
study judicial assistance between the United States and other nations
and to recommend improvements that would aid the settlement of inter-
national disputes in these new commercial contexts.' 9 The Commission
ultimately recommended what is now FRCP 4(i).20
FRCP 4(i) is a supplement that provides five alternative methods for
serving foreign parties abroad. A party may serve a foreign defendant
(1) in a manner provided by the foreign nation for service involving liti-
gation within its own courts of general jurisdiction;2 1 (2) as directed by a
foreign authority's response to a letter rogatory, so long as the method
is reasonably calculated to give actual notice; 22 (3) by personal service to
the party, an officer of a corporate party, or the party's agent;2 3 (4) by
forms of mail requiring a signed receipt; 24 or (5) in a manner prescribed
by an order of the district court.2 5
FRCP 4(i) "introduces considerable further flexibility by permitting
the foreign service and the return thereof to be carried out in any of a
number of alternative ways that are also declared to be sufficient."' 26
Moreover, the five alternative methods of service "allow accommodation
to the policies and procedures of the foreign country." 2 7
2. FRCP 4(i)'s Operation
a. Authority to Serve
FRCP 4(i) does not independently authorize service abroad. To invoke
FRCP 4(i), federal or state law must authorize extraterritorial service; a
party may only use the five alternative methods of service "when the
federal or state law referred to in subdivision (e) of this rule authorizes
service upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in
18. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5202.
19. Id. at 1-2, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at 5201.
20. The commission recommended the substance of FRCP 4(i) in its fourth
report. The Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court both approved Rule 4(i) in
1963. Amram, supra note 14, at 650.
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(A).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(B).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(C).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(D).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(E).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) Advisory Committee's Notes to the 1963 Amendments.
27. Id. According to Benjamin Kaplan, Federal Rules reporter at the time of the
1963 amendments,
The situations in which service in federal actions must be made abroad are
diverse and so are the laws and conditions of the foreign countries. It there-
fore seemed wise to set up a number of alternative permissible manners of
service that would provide a fair amount of choice and flexibility while assur-
ing that the foreign defendant would get good notice.
Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (I), 77 HARV. L.
REV. 633, 635 (1964). Yet, "if enforcement is to be sought in the country of service,
the foreign law should be examined before a choice is made among the methods of
service allowed by subdivision (i)." Supra note 26.
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which the district court is held."' 28 Under FRCP 4(e), a party may serve
an individual who is not an inhabitant of the forum state in which the
district court sits whenever a state or federal statute permits such extra-
territorial service.29 Therefore, before considering the alternatives set
forth in subdivision (i), a party must determine whether any statutes per-
mit service abroad.
b. Manner of Service
Once a party determines that it has the authority to serve abroad, it must
then decide the method or manner of service. As a supplement,3 0 FRCP
4(i) is not the exclusive method of service abroad. For instance, FRCP
4(e) permits service in the manner prescribed either by statute or by the
Federal Rules. Alternatively, a party may choose the flexibility provided
under FRCP 4(i) to serve abroad.3 1 Among the alternatives from which
to choose under FRCP 4(i), a party may serve a foreign defendant by
mail.3
2
A party serving by mail must satisfy three requirements. First, the
complaint or summons must be addressed and dispatched to the foreign
party.33 Second, it must be dispatched by the federal court clerk.3 4
Third, the party serving the complaint must have proof of service
including a signed receipt by the addressee or other evidence satisfac-
tory to the court.3 5 Mail service is a popular method because it provides
an inexpensive and expeditious form of service requiring minimal activ-
ity in a foreign nation.36
B. State Service Provisions
State service provisions are important for two reasons. First, the state
service rule is independently significant where an American plaintiff sues
a foreign defendant in state court. Second, FRCP 4(e) permits a plaintiff
in federal court to serve a foreign defendant in a manner prescribed by
state law. The state provisions applicable in both contexts generally
permit service abroad by mail without any observable limitations.3 7
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
30. See supra note 15.
31. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
32. This Note principally focuses upon the mail service alternative. For a brief
description of the other four methods of service provided under Rule 4(i), see 1 B.
RISTAU, INTERNATIONALJUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL) § 3-14 (1984).
This Note confines itself to mail service because it adequately demonstrates the con-
flict between domestic law and the Hague Service Convention, and because it is a
popular method of service.
33. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(i)(1)(D).
34. Id.
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2).
36. See, e.g., B. RIsTAu, supra note 32, at § 3-14.
37. See, e.g., ARIz. R. CIv. P. 4(e)(2)(a) (West 1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-58-
119(a) (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-431 (1981); HAW. REV. STAT. § 634-24 (1985);
MASs. GEN. L. ch. 223 A, § 6 (1986); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 308(2) (McKinney
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C. The Hague Convention on Service
1. History, Development and Purpose of the Convention
In October, 1964, delegates from the United States and twenty-two
other nations to the Hague Conference on Private International Law
considered and developed a convention on the service of judicial and
extrajudicial documents. 38 On November 15, 1965, these twenty-three
nations finished the final draft of the Hague Service Convention.3 9 The
United States was the first nation to ratify the Convention when on April
14, 1967, the Senate unanimously approved the Hague Conference's
final draft.40 Since then, twenty-four other nations have adopted the
Convention.4 1
The Hague Service Convention advances three important objec-
tives. First, the Hague Conference intended to create a simple and
expeditious procedure for service of process in an effort to encourage
international judicial cooperation. 42 Second, the Convention attempts
to prescribe means of service that would withstand attack in later suits to
enforce a foreign judgment.4 3 Third, the Conference adopted provi-
sions directed at avoiding default judgments.4 4 By satisfying these
1986); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 253(2) (McKinney 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12,
§ 1702.01 (West 1980); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., R. 403, 404(3) (Purdon 1987).
38. On December 30, 1963, President Johnson signed a resolution authorizing
United States participation in the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
Pub. L. No. 88-244, 77 Stat. 775 (1963). See Amram, supra note 14; Note, The Effect of
the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad ofJudicial and Extrajudicial Documents, 2 COR-
NELL INT'L LJ. 125 (1969). By participating in the Conference, the United States
hoped to constrain European forms of service notorious for failing to give adequate
notice to American parties. Note, supra, at 129-30. Four days before commencement
of the Hague Conference, President Johnson signed into law a series of proposals
recommended by the Commission on International Judicial Rules of Procedure to
augment international judicial cooperation. Pub. L. No. 88-619, 78 Stat. 995 (1964).
See Amram, supra note 14, at 650, 652. The United States delegation to the Hague
Conference discussed the proposal with delegates from other nations. Id. at 652.
The United States reforms for modernizing and encouraging international judicial
assistance influenced the Hague Conference delegates when they drafted the Hague
Service Convention. Id.
39. Note, The Hague Service Convention and Agency Concepts: Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 391, 395 (1987).
40. See Comment, US. Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Service of Documents
Abroad, 61 AM.J. INT'L L. 1019, 1019 (1967).
41. The following nations adopted the Convention after the United States: Anti-
gua and Barboda, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Egypt, Finland, France, The Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Seychelles, Swe-
den, Turkey, and The United Kingdom. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION
21-23 (1983). See also 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAw DIRECTORY (Part VII) 2 (1987).
42. Convention on the Service Abroad ofJudicial and Extrajudicial Documents in
Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658
U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Service Convention].
43. Note, supra note 39, at 396.
44. Id.
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objectives, the Convention ensures adequate and timely notice.4 5
The United States Senate in supporting such an international agree-
ment also had envisioned several other objectives in ratifying the Con-
vention. First, the Senate wanted to protect American citizens in foreign
courts: "Given the continually increasing volume of American travel
abroad, especially in Europe, of international business transactions, of
United States investments abroad, the subject of insuring that United
States citizens who were sued in foreign courts received notice ... is a
matter of substantial importance to this country. ' 4 6 Second, the Senate
wanted to provide a uniform system of procedure to encourage foreign
judicial assistance and cooperation:
With 49 separate procedural jurisdictions in the United States... a uni-
tary approach is the only solution. We can hardly expect (a foreign gov-
ernment) to look favorably on a program of separate negotiation with the
representatives of each of the 48 states and with the representatives of the
Federal government. The problems must be solved through a single uni-
fied set of discussions, the results of which will be effective for all the 49
jurisdictions.4 7
Third, "the convention carries out the spirit and purpose of Act No. 88-
619 and the intent of Congress in the area of international judicial
assistance. ' 4 8 The Senate's goals are consistent with the objectives
stated by the Hague Service Convention.
2. Operation of the Convention
The Convention is divided into three sections that treat judicial docu-
ments, 49 extrajudicial documents,50 and general matters51 "in all ...
civil or commercial matters .... -"52 Under the section dealing with judi-
cial documents, Article 2 requires each signatory to designate a Central
45. For other commentary on the purposes of the Hague Service Convention, see
HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 41, at 28; S. EXEc.
REP. No. 6, supra note 4, at 1, 6.
46. S. EXEC. REP. No. 6, supra note 4, at 6.
47. S. REP. No. 2392, supra note 4, at 7, repfinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 5206 (statement of Lloyd Wright, former President, American Bar
Association).
48. S. REP. No. 6, supra note 4, at 6 (statement by Richard D. Kearney, Deputy
Legal Adviser, Department of State). Public Law 88-619, which revised 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1696, 1781 and 1782, provided liberal mechanisms for service of documents
internationally as well as for the taking of evidence through depositions or produc-
tion of documents. For a discussion of the reforms embodied in Public Law 88-619,
see Amram, supra note 14, at 651.
49. Service Convention, supra note 42, at chpt. I, 20 U.S.T. at 362-65.
50. Id. at chpt. II, 20 U.S.T. at 365.
51. Id. at chpt. III, 20 U.S.T. at 365-67.
52. Id. at art. 1, 20 U.S.T. at 362. In speaking of the applicability of the Conven-
tion, Article One generally speaks in broad terms. "Civil or Commercial Matters"
has different meanings for different signatory nations. This language does not
include criminal proceedings in the United States and in the United Kingdom, fiscal
and criminal matters in France, administrative issues in Japan, public law enforce-
ment in West Germany, and family law in Egypt. See I B. RIsTAU, supra note 32, at
§ 4-4. It is important to note, however, that the scope of the Convention is limited
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Authority to handle service requests from other signatory nations.53
Article 5 indicates that the Central Authority may authorize service by
the internal law of the nation5 4 or in a manner requested by the party
attempting to serve if not inconsistent with the internal law. 55 Article
10, however, provides alternative methods of service that do not require
the assistance of the Central Authority. 56 A party is free "to send judi-
cial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad" 57 or to
"effect service" directly through judicial officials in the state of destina-
tion via judicial officers from the state of origin. 58 These alternatives
apply so long as a signatory nation does not object in accordance with
Article 21 of Chapter III.59
Article 10(a) is the only provision that can be construed to authorize
service by mail. Yet, this alternative service provision is a source of con-
troversy. Some argue that Article 10 does not authorize service of a
complaint or summons by mail. 60 Articles 10(b) and (c) refer to the
freedom "to effect service." In dealing with postal channels, Article
10(a), however, only discusses the freedom "to send" judicial docu-
ments and does not specifically authorize service by mail. Given the spe-
cific references to means of service in other provisions and the absence
of such language in Article 10(a) or in any other part of the Convention,
the Convention may not provide for service by mail.6 1
because it provides methods of service but cannot authorize service independently.
DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981).
53. Service Convention, supra note 42, at art. 2, 20 U.S.T. at 362-63.
54. Id. at art. 5(a), 20 U.S.T. at 362.
55. Id. at art. 5(b), 20 U.S.T. at 362.
56. Id. at art. 10, 20 U.S.T. at 363.
57. Id. at art. 10(a), 20 U.S.T. at 363.
58. Id. at art. 10(b)-(c), 20 U.S.T. at 363.
59. The alternatives enumerated under Article 10 are available "[p]rovided the
state of destination does not object.. ." Id. at art. 10, 20 U.S.T. at 363. The Conven-
tion requires that "[e]ach contracting state... inform the Ministry... of... opposi-
tion to the use of methods of transmission pursuant to articles 8 and 10. . ." Id. at
art. 21, 20 U.S.T. 365. Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Japan, Norway, Turkey, and West
Germany currently object to service by mail. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, supra note 41, at 97, 101, 106, 118, 126. Though Botswana has not
declared any general objection, service by mail is insufficient where matters are
before the High Court. Id. at 95.
60. See Cooper v. Makita, No. 87-0053-P, slip op. at 2 (D. Me. Sept. 24, 1987)
(unpublished) (the Hague Service Convention does not provide for service by mail);
Mommsen v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D. 444, 446 (S.D. Iowa 1985) ("Sending a copy of a
summons and complaint by registered mail directly to a defendant in a foreign coun-
try is not a method of service of process allowed by the Hague Convention").
61. In Momnmsen, the court adopted this line of reasoning:
The Hague Convention repeatedly refers to "service" of documents, and if
the drafters of the Convention had meant for subparagraph (a) of Article 10
to provide an additional manner of service ofjudicial documents, they would
have used the word "service". To hold that subparagraph (a) permits direct
mail service of process, would go beyond the plain meaning of the word
"send" and would create a method of service of process at odds with the
other methods of service permitted by the Convention.
108 F.R.D. at 446.
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Others, however, indicate that the Convention was meant to permit
service by mail. 62 In discussing Article 10(a), the negotiation history
explicitly mentioned service when it discussed the use of postal chan-
nels. 63 Article 10(a)'s language is apparently the product of a drafting
error and the Convention permits service by mail so long as a signatory
nation does not object under Article 21.64
Compared to the alternative service provisions under the judicial
documents section, the extrajudicial documents6 5 and general clauses 66
sections are non-controversial. The extrajudicial documents section
deals with items that are not directly connected with litigation, including
the transmission of demands for payment 67 and notices to quit in con-
nection with leaseholds.68
The general clauses section, however, does contain two important
provisions. Article 21 permits a signatory nation to object generally to
the alternative methods of transmission provided under Articles 8 and
10.69 Article 19 suggests that a party may serve a foreign defendant in a
foreign signatory nation under that nation's internal law even though
the Convention does not provide for that particular method of transmis-
sion.70 The American delegation to the Hague Conference requested
Article 19 to ensure that the Convention would not upset existing phi-
62. See Precision Machine Works v. King, No. 85-C-6782, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Ill.
June 9, 1986) (unpublished) ("Japan ... did not object to 10(a), which allows direct
service to persons abroad through postal channels.... Accordingly, service by mail
is not barred by the Hague Convention"); Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, 631
F.Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (service of process on Japanese distiller by mail under
Article 10 of Hague Convention was sufficient); Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Ind., 597
F. Supp. 1080 (E.D. Va. 1984) (service by mail on Japanese manufacturer was effec-
tive under Hague Convention); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F.
Supp. 1182, 1206 (D.D.C. 1984) (article 10(a) of the Hague Convention permits ser-
vice by mail so long as signatory nation does not object).
63. In explaining the background and purpose of Article 10(a), the negotiation
history referred to the use of "postal channels" and indicated that the provision
"permits service." I B. RisTAu, supra note 32, at § 4-28 (emphasis added).
64. According to one distinguished commentator on the Hague Service
Convention,
It should be stressed that in permitting the utilization of postal channels ...
the draft convention did not intend to pass on the validity of this mode of
transmission under the law of the forum state: in order for the postal channel
to be utilized, it is necessary that it be authorized by the law of the forum
state.
Id.
For information on the drafting error, see id.; supra note 32, at § 4-28 ("The use of
different terms in the several paragraphs of Article 10 must be attributed to careless
drafting").
65. Service Convention, supra note 42, at chpt. II, 20 U.S.T. at 365.
66. Id. at chpt. III, 20 U.S.T. at 365-67.
67. See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4 1, at 43.
68. Id. at 43.
69. Service Convention, supra note 42, at art. 21, 20 U.S.T. at 365 ("Each con-
tracting state shall inform the ministry, where appropriate, of... opposition to the
use of methods of transmission pursuant to articles 8 and 10...").
70. Id. at art. 19, 20 U.S.T. at 365 ("[t]o the extent that the internal law of a
contracting State permits methods of transmission, other than those provided for in
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losophy, procedure or policy regarding service of foreign documents
within the United States.7 '
D. The Conflict Between Domestic Service Provisions and the Hague
Convention
The parallel service provisions of domestic law and the Hague Service
Convention often foster confusion. The language of domestic service
rules is a trap for the unwary, often permitting service by mail to foreign
parties without limitation. 72 For instance, FRCP 4(i) permits service by
mail without imposing any restrictions or encouraging resort to the
Hague Service Convention provisions. The accompanying advisory
committee notes fail to mention the existence of the Hague Service Con-
vention and its seemingly mandatory language. Yet, the Hague Service
Convention either prohibits service by mail at all times or prohibits such
service when the signatory nation has objected generally in accordance
with Article 21.73 Given the optional and far-reaching language of Rule
4(i), attorneys plausibly could assume that no conflicting legal obliga-
tions exist. This confusion manifests itself in a wide array of service dis-
putes7 4 and has led to efforts to amend FRCP 4(i).7 5 Moreover, the
Rules Enabling Act 7 6 gives the impression that the Federal Rules super-
sede all conflicting statutes and treaties. 7 7
This confusion has several damaging consequences. First, mistak-
enly using a service method offensive to a foreign nation may hamper
foreign recognition and enforcement of the American judgment
abroad. 78 Second, uncertainty in serving a foreign party places greater
burdens on court time and increases litigation costs by fostering dis-
putes about the sufficiency of service. 79 Third, some nations impose
the preceding articles, of documents coming from abroad, for service within its terri-
tory, the present Convention shall not affect such provisions").
71. 113 CONG. REc. 9404 (April 13, 1967).
72. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
74. See infra note 79.
75. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
77. See infra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
78. See 4A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1133
(1987) ("a foreign country is more likely to honor or enforce ajudgment rendered in
the United States if original service is made in a fashion familiar to the country in
which enforcement is sought and consonant with its notions of fairness"). See also
Kaplan, supra note 27, at 635-36 ("If the manner of service is not repugnant to the
laws of the foreign country, the chances that a judgment in the action will be
respected there may be enhanced"); Smit, International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure,
61 COLUM. L. REV. 1031, 1040 (1961) ("Since service in a foreign country requires
the performance of acts in that country, the extent to which it can be made is ordinar-
ily at the sufferance of the foreign sovereign, whose objections may affect some or all
incidents of the service attempted").
79. Conflict between domestic service provisions and the Hague Service Conven-
tion has prompted numerous cases involving the sufficiency of service abroad. See,
e.g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986); Vorhees v. Fischer & Kreckc,
697 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1983); International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166
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criminal penalties for inappropriately serving by mail.80 Fourth, this
confusion poses statute of limitations problems.8 1 Given these substan-
tial consequences, a coherent understanding of the interplay between
domestic service by mail provisions and the Hague Service Convention
is important.
II. Current Judicial Attempts to Reconcile the Hague Service
Convention and Domestic Service Provisions
A. State Court Resolution
Reconciling the Hague Service Convention with conflicting domestic
service provisions requires a survey of state and federal decisional law.
To be effective, any proposal to reconcile the Hague Convention and
(2d Cir. 1979); Cooper v. Makita, No. 87-0053-P, slip op. (D. Me. Sept. 24, 1987)
(unpublished); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C.
1984); Harris v. Browning-Ferris Ind., 100 F.R.D. 775 (D. La. 1984); Tamari v. Bache
& Co., 431 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Shoei Kako v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.
App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973). These cases are discussed infra.
80. See 4A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 78, at § 1133 ("A person not quali-
fied by the law of the foreign country to make service may find that he is subject to
criminal sanctions. . ."). See also Kaplan, supra note 27, at 635 ("Some [foreign coun-
tries] specify methods of service which may conceivably go counter to the policies of
particular foreign countries, for example, a policy which regards service... punish-
able unless comporting with some approved local procedure").
81. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4 Supplementary Practice Commentary-C4-34
(U.S.C.A. Supp. 1987) ("Generally speaking, no mistake under Rule 4 carries a seri-
ous consequence unless the statute of limitations has expired . . . it is the interim
passing of the statute of limitations that will prove the plaintiff's undoing in a new
action.. ."). For example, suppose a federal court with diversity jurisdiction finds
that the plaintiff served the defendant insufficiently and therefore dismisses the case.
The plaintiff must now reinitiate the action and properly reserve the defendant in the
time remaining, if any, under the state statute of limitations. This is particularly seri-
ous in a diversity action where the court has found that serving a foreign defendant
by mail is insufficient and where the applicable state statute of limitations does not
toll until service. Given that service by mail is out of the question, the plaintiff will
have to effect service under the Hague Convention through a central authority. Ser-
vice through a central authority, central authority approval, and other formalities will
further delay service. Yet, the plaintiff is working without the benefit of a newly com-
menced statute of limitations period. See Bisones v. Toyota Motor Corp., Civ. A. No.
85-2365-S, 1986 WL 21,345 (D. Kan. 1986) (unpublished) (products liability action
dismissed under state statute of limitations where service was effected under the
Hague Convention beyond the limitations period, even though plaintiff faithfully
made five attempts to effect service). See also THE COMMITrEE ON FEDERAL COURTS OF
THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, SERVICE OF PROCESS ABROAD: A NUTS AND
BOLTS GUIDE, reprinted in 122 F.R.D. 63, 77 ("[S]ince the Hague Convention is not
one of the methods of service prescribed in Rule 4(i), it is not excepted from the
requirement of Rule 4(j) that the summons and complaint be served within 120 days
after the complaint is filed. Failure to meet that deadline will result in dismissal of
the complaint-and loss of the right to pursue the action if the statute of limitations
has run... " (footnotes omitted)). But see Bailey v. Boilmakers Local 667 of Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Boilmakers, 480 F. Supp. 274, 278 (N.D. W.Va. 1979) ("If the
first service of process is ineffective, a motion to dismiss should not be granted, but
rather the Court should treat the motion in the alternative, as one to quash the ser-
vice of process and the case should be retained on the docket pending effective
service").
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domestic service provisions must treat similarly situated parties equally,
whether in state or federal court, and must maintain uniformity of pro-
cedure to foster simplicity and to avoid confusion.8 2
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,8 3
all federal laws and treaties made under United States authority are "the
supreme Law of the Land."'8 4 Generally, state courts have held that the
Hague Service Convention supersedes state service provisions by virtue
of the Supremacy Clause.8 5 This comports with the Senate's intention
to provide a uniform system of procedure in all of the states with respect
to foreign service.8 6
Two courts have held, however, that the Supremacy Clause does
not necessarily subordinate state service provisions to the Hague Service
Convention. In McNulty v. Rocomat,8 7 the plaintiff was not required to
serve in accordance with the Convention because the defendant received
adequate notice and did not claim unfair advantage or surprise. Simi-
larly, a Wisconsin state court noted in dictum that, although service
under the Convention ensures adequate and timely notice, a plaintiff
may employ other methods of service as well.8 8
B. Federal Court Resolution
Federal courts seem to have adopted two different approaches in
attempting to reconcile FRCP 4(i) and the Hague Service Convention
82. See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
83. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
84. U.S. CONST.'art. VI, cl.2.
85. See Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So. 2d 766 (Ala. 1983) (service by mail on West
German defendant found insufficient given that plaintiff must comply with terms of
the Hague Convention in accordance with Constitution's Supremacy Clause); Volks-
wagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Volkswagen of America, 443 So. 2d 880 (Ala. 1983)
(the Hague Service Convention has the status of a treaty and is therefore the
supreme law of the land); Kadota v. Hosogai, 125 Ariz. 131, 608 P.2d 68 (Ct. App.
1980) (to extent state civil procedure is inconsistent with the Hague Service Conven-
tion, the Convention controls); Porsche v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 755, 177
Cal. Rptr. 155 (1981) (court quashed mail service on West German defendant pursu-
ant to Hague Service Convention given that federal Supremacy Clause binds court to
Convention); Schlunck v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 495 N.E.2d 1114 (Il.
App. I Dist. 1986) (by virtue of Supremacy Clause, state court bound by Hague Con-
vention even in face of contrary state law); Cintron v. W & D Machinery Co., 182 N.J.
Super. 126, 440 A.2d 76 (1981) (service by mail upon West German defendant inef-
fective given German objection to service by mail under the Hague Convention);
Aspinall's Club Ltd. v. Aryeh, 86 A.D.2d 428, 450 N.Y.S.2d 199 (App. Div. 1982)
(more stringent state service law not to supersede Hague Convention as federal law
given Supremacy Clause); Law v. Bayerische Motoren Werke, 88 A.D.2d 504, 449
N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (service by mail and upon Secretary of State in
suit against West German defendant objecting to mail service under the Hague Ser-
vice Convention insufficient given supremacy of Convention); Cippala v. Picard
Porsche Audi, Inc., 496 A.2d 130 (R.I. 1985) (despite state provisions permitting
other methods for effectuating service, Supremacy Clause requires plaintiff to comply
with terms of Hague Service Convention).
86. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
87. 132 Misc. 2d 1064 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
88. In Re Marriage of Vause v. Vause, 140 Wis. 2d 157, (Ct. App. 1987).
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with respect to service abroad by mail. Some courts treat the Conven-
tion as a permissive supplement, merely intended to facilitate fair and
effective service.89 This interpretation is suspect because of the
mandatory language of the Convention. Other courts require exclusive
use of the Hague Service Convention where the party served resides in a
signatory nation.90 As a general approach, the purposes of the Conven-
tion seem to render this interpretation incomplete.
1. The Hague Service Convention Does Not Supersede FRCP 4(i)
According to some courts, the Hague Service Convention is merely a
permissive supplement that neither abrogates the provisions of FRCP
4(i) nor prohibits service by methods unavailable under the Convention.
These courts often have reasoned that the United States did not intend
to preempt FRCP 4(i) by ratifying the Convention. For example, in
International Controls Corporation v. Vesco,9 1 respondents served petitioner,
a resident of the Bahamas, in accordance with FRCP 4(i)(1)(E) "as
directed by order of court." Petitioner sought dismissal on grounds that
the Hague Service Convention did not authorize this manner of service.
Though the court held the Convention inapplicable, as the Bahamas was
not a signatory, the court nonetheless commented on the interplay
between the Convention and FRCP 4. The court noted in dictum that
"the Convention was not intended to abrogate the methods of service
prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4."92
Similarly, in a case involving a good faith but failed attempt to abide
by the Hague Service Convention, another court noted that the Conven-
tion does not circumscribe the judicial discretion and flexibility contem-
plated by Rule 4(i):
The Hague Convention carefully articulates the procedure which a liti-
gant must follow in order to perfect service abroad, but it does not pre-
scribe the procedure for the forum court to follow should an element of
the procedure fail. Rule 4 stresses actual notice rather than strict formal-
ism. [citations omitted]. There is no indication from the language of the
Hague Convention that it was intended to supercede [sic] this general
89. See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 100-23 and accompanying text. The tension between these two
positions has been noted by several commentators. See, e.g., COMMITrEE ON FEDERAL
COURTS, supra note 81, at 71-72; 4 J. MOORE, J. LuCAS, H. FINK & C. THOMPSON,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrIcE 4.45 (2d ed. 1987) ("While there have been district
court cases holding that service of process in a foreign country pursuant to Rule 4(i)
was deficient for failure to comply with the Hague Service Convention provisions, it
is by no means settled that Rule 4(i) has been superseded").
91. 593 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1979).
92. Id. at 179-80. See also Saez Rivera v. Nissan Mfg. Co., 788 F.2d 819, 821 (Ist
Cir. 1986) (service upon Japanese defendant) ("Service could have been had upon
Nissan, in Japan pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) or, where appropriate, the Hague
[Service] Convention .. .") (emphasis added); Barefield v. Sund Emba, Civ. A. No.
85-4490, 1985 WL 4280 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (unpublished) (service upon Swedish corpo-
ration) ("Where service of process on a foreign corporation cannot be accomplished
under Rule 4(d) or Rule 4(e), service mar be made under Rule 4(i) ... or under the
Hague Convention") (emphasis added).
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and flexible scheme, particularly where no injustice or prejudice is likely
to result to the party located abroad, or to the interests of the affected
signatory country.93
Concluding that "[t]he Hague Convention should not be construed so
as to foreclose judicial discretion when such discretion needs to be exer-
cised,"' 94 the court construed the Convention as complementary to the
provisions of FRCP 4(i).9 5
Other courts have reasoned that a permissive, supplemental
approach corresponds to the purposes of the Convention. In Newport
Components v. NEC Home Electronics,9 6 California electronic equipment
distributors brought state and federal antitrust claims against a Japanese
corporation in federal court. Plaintiffs served the Japanese corporation
via first class mail. The defendant in turn sought to dismiss the case for
defective service based on Japan's objection to mail service under the
Convention. The court refused to dismiss for insufficiency of service
despite plaintiffs' failure to comply with the Convention. The court
stated that the purposes of the Convention are not at odds with permit-
ting service by methods unavailable under the Convention:
If it be assumed that the purpose of the convention is to establish one
method to avoid the difficulties and controversy attendant to the use of
other methods .... it does not necessarily follow that other methods may
not be used if effective proof of delivery can be made.9 7
The court asserted that the Convention should be considered in every
case but need not be the primary source of authority.
The most extreme subordination of the Hague Service Convention
to the provisions of FRCP 4(i) occurred in Isothermics v. U.S. Energy
Research and Development Agency,98 where a federal district court validated
service by mail despite a specific objection filed by a signatory nation
under the Convention. Plaintiff ("ISO") filed a complaint against Japa-
nese defendants, alleging patent infringement. Plaintiff served by mail
93. Fox v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 103 F.R.D. 453, 455 (W.D. Tenn.
1984).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 671 F. Supp. 1525 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
97. Id. at 1542 (quoting Shoei Kako v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 821
109 Cal. Rptr. 402, 411 (1973)). See also Tamari v. Bache & Co., 431 F.Supp. 1226
(N.D. Ill. 1977), aff'd 565 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting from Shoei Kako v. Supe-
rior Court). Moreover, the Tamari court noted that "the treaty was not meant to abro-
gate the provisions of Rule 4, as evidenced by the fact that there has been no change
in the provisions of the Rule since the treaty became effective." Id. at 1229. But see
Note, Service Abroad ofJudicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters
Under the Hague Convention, 3 REV. LIT. 493 (1983) (arguing that the Tamari court
misused Shoei Kako, as evidenced by the fact that the two courts reached the opposite
result). See also Shoei Kako v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 822, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 402, 412 (1973) ("It is more reasonable to infer that in approving subdivision
(a) of Article 10 the Senate intended to retain service by mail . . . as an effective
method of service of process in a foreign country unless that country objected to
those provisions").
98. 434 F. Supp. 1155 (D.N.J. 1977).
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in accordance with FRCP 4(i)(1)(D). Defendants alleged insufficiency of
service of process on the grounds ofJapan's objection to service by mail
under the Hague Service Convention. Without considering the Conven-
tion, the court declined to quash service on the ground that "the added
defendants, even if not effectively served with process, are at least on
notice of ISO's claim." 9 9 This approach is most extreme because it
ignores the sovereignty of other signatory nations.
2. The Convention Supersedes Contrary Federal Procedures
A number of courts have held that the Hague Service Convention super-
sedes contrary federal procedures. For example, in Teknekron Manage-
ment v. Quante Fernmeldetechnik,100 an American plaintiff sued a German
corporation to enforce obligations under a stock purchase agreement.
Plaintiff first served the summons and complaint via first class mail.
Realizing that such service was contrary to Germany's objection to ser-
vice by mail under the Hague Service Convention, plaintiff attempted to
effect service a second time. Defendant nonetheless moved to dismiss
on the grounds that plaintiff failed to translate the service documents
into the defendant's native language as required by the Convention. In
quashing plaintiff's service, the court held that "[w]hen an American
plaintiff attempts to serve a party located within one of the countries
which is a signatory to the Hague Convention, service must be effected
strictly according to the procedures set forth in that treaty."''
Similarly, in Hantover, Inc. v. Omet, S.N.C. of Volentieri,102 an Italian
defendant objected to plaintiff's request that the court permit service by
mail under FRCP 4(i)(1)(E), arguing that "because Italy is a signatory to
the Hague Convention ... Rule 4(i) may not be utilized to obtain ser-
vice .... 103 Accepting the proposition that service by mail is impermis-
sible under the Convention, the court held that FRCP 4(i)'s provisions
must yield to the requirements of the Convention.1
0 4
Conversely, some courts have held that FRCP 4(i) does not place
limits on the operation of the Convention. In Ackennann v. Levine, 10 5
German plaintiffs sought to enforce a foreign judgment in the United
States for the recovery of legal fees. The court held that service is valid
even though it satisfies only the Convention and not the Federal Rules:
"[w]hether Ackermann's service satisfied Rule 4 as it then existed or as it
now exists is irrelevant .... ,106 Rather, the Hague Service Convention
"is manifestly not limited" by FRCP 4; 107 "the United States has made
no declaration or limitation to its ratification of the Convention or
99. Id. at 1158.
100. 115 F.R.D. 175 (D. Nev. 1987).
101. Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
102. 688 F. Supp. 1377 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
103. Id. at 1384.
104. Id. at 1384-85.
105. 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986).
106. Id. at 840.
107. Id.
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otherwise regarding mail service under the Convention."10 8
Courts have advanced three reasons for finding that the Hague Ser-
vice Convention supersedes contrary federal procedure. First, one
court adopted an approach where the last statement in time prevails. 10 9
A self-executing treaty is of equal legal force to federal statutes, 110 and
where a treaty and a statute conflict, the last in time prevails. I Con-
gress enacted the FRCP 4(i) provisions in 1963112 and the Convention
went into force in 1969.113 Therefore, the Convention prevails. 114
Second, two courts have held that the Hague Service Convention
supersedes contrary federal procedures because the specific terms of the
Convention control the more general provisions of FRCP 4. In Harris v.
Browning-Ferris Industries, 115 the plaintiff contended that the court should
resolve conflicts between FRCP 4 and the Convention in favor of FRCP
4 because FRCP 4 was amended in 1983, after Congress ratified the
Convention."t 6 Rejecting plaintiff's contention, the court quashed ser-
vice for failure to satisfy the Convention: "The Hague Convention
applies to all cases where service is to be made in a Foreign country and
the countries involved are signatories to the Convention."" 17 The court
clearly indicated that the Convention supersedes Rule 4: "The provi-
sions of Rule 4(i) are intended to cover those instances where service in
a foreign country is not prohibited by an international treaty." ' " 8 The
court arrived at this resolution because the Convention is more specific
than FRCP 4(i): "Because the Hague Convention is specific as to how
service is to be made in a foreign country and the Federal rules are gen-
eral and designed to cover all circumstances, the court finds that the
provisions of the Hague Convention must control the manner of service
in this action."' "19
The District Court for the District of Columbia also quashed service
for failure to follow the more particular requirements of the Conven-
tion, even though service notified defendants of the suit: "The statute
[FRCP 4(i)] is a general guide, specifying a proper way to effect service
108. Id.
109. Vorhees v. Fischer and Krecke, 697 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1983).
110. Id. at 575. See also Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118 (1933) (1924
treaty with Great Britain permitting boarding of vessel by Coast Guard for suspected
smuggling supersedes inconsistent provisions of the 1922 Tariff Act, "being later in
date"); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the Constitution a
treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legis-
lation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and
no superior efficacy is given to either over the other ... if the two are inconsistent,
the one last in date will control the other .....
111. Vorhees, 697 F.2d at 575.
112. Id. at 576.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 100 F.R.D. 775 (D. La. 1984).
116. Id. at 777.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 778.
119. Id. at 777-78.
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for every situation. To the contrary, the Hague Convention addresses
only the means of effecting service in those foreign countries which have
expressly consented to bind themselves to the terms of the Treaty. It is
axiomatic that specific terms control general ones."1 20 The court rein-
forced this judgment by discussing how adherence to the Hague Con-
vention fosters international cooperation and goodwill. 12 1
Third, the Supreme Court has noted in dictum that the language of
the Hague Service Convention's preamble manifests an intention to
make the Convention an exclusive source of service of process proce-
dure.' 22 The court noted that the "mandatory language" contained in
the Convention's preamble constitutes a "model exclusivity provision,"
suggesting that future conflicts between the Convention and the Federal
Rules would be resolved in favor of applying the Convention's
provisions. 123
C. The Current Judicial Attempt Is a Failure
The current judicial attempt to reconcile the tension between domestic
service provisions and the Hague Service Convention fails for three rea-
sons. First, the cases foster confusion by articulating two very different
approaches. Second, the approaches articulated by federal courts do
not satisfy principles of American civil procedure law. Third, the
approaches do not adequately satisfy the objectives of the Hague Service
Convention.
1. Cases Dealing with the Interplay Between the Hague Service Convention
and FRCP 4 Foster Confusion by Articulating Two Very Different
Approaches
The federal judiciary has failed to reconcile the tension between domes-
tic service provisions and the Hague Service Convention. By taking two
different positions in attempting to resolve the interplay between
domestic service provisions and the Convention, federal courts intensify
rather than ameliorate confusion. The inconsistency between the two
approaches increases costs by making improper service more prob-
able' 2 4 and by exposing practitioners to foreign criminal sanctions
imposed in some nations for inappropriately serving by mail. 125
120. Color Systems, Inc. v. Meteor Photo Reprographic Systems, 1987 WL 11086
(D.D.C. 1987) (unpublished).
121. Id.
122. Societ6.Vationale, 107 S.Ct. 2542, 2550-51 n.15 (1987). See also Volkswagen-
werk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunck, 108 S.Ct. 2104, 2111 (1988) ("[C]ompliance
with the Convention is mandatory in all cases to which it applies . . .") (dictum).
Note, however, that I'olkswagemnerk v. Schhnck does not address the question of how
to reconcile FRCP 4 and the Hague Service Convention. Schhtck involved the inter-
play between the Hague Service Convention and state law' in the context of serving
domestic subsidiaries of a foreign country. Note also that the Supreme Court
decided that the Convention did not apply.
123. Societ6.Vationale, 107 S.Ct. at 2550-51 n.15.
124. See, e.g., supra notes 79, 81 and accompanying text.
125. Supra note 80.
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The federal judiciary's approaches also fail to facilitate the settle-
ment of disputes. By creating inconsistency and unpredictability, the
judiciary has increased the likelihood of nonenforcement of a judgment
by foreign courts. 12 6 Similarly, the multiple approaches adopted by the
federal courts and the different approach taken by state courts do not
leave the practitioner with a simple or reliable method of service. 12 7
These mixed signals from the federal system leave open the question of
whether to use the Convention or domestic service provisions. More-
over, though FRCP 4(i) and the Convention were intended to augment
judicial cooperation by providing simplicity, 128 the current judicial
approach, insofar as it views the Convention as permissive authority
only, will further confuse practitioners by prescribing a different set of
resolutions for state and federal courts. 129
Finally, the current judicial attempt harms parties and practitioners
in several ways. The confusion caused by different approaches exposes
litigants to statute of limitations problems that may accompany a dismis-
sal for improper service.130 The confusion also increases the likelihood
of an improper form of service which a foreign court will not recognize
when asked to enforce an American judgment. 13 1 At the very least,
defective service wastes time and increases costs.
2. Neither of the Judicial Resolutions Satisfies Principles of American Civil
Procedure Law
Reading the Convention as an exclusive source of service procedure
may be inconsistent with the role of the Federal Rules because it is
unclear whether an interpretation of the Convention which preempts
FRCP 4 would comply with the Rules Enabling Act ("REA"). 132 The
REA deals with the force and effect of statutes that are inconsistent with
provisions of the Federal Rules: "(b) ... All laws in conflict with such rules
shall be of no further force and effect after such rules have taken effect .... ,, 3
Under the REA, Federal Rules supersede inconsistent federal statutes in
effect at the time of enactment of the Federal Rules or of an amendment
126. Unpredictability increases the likelihood for mistakes in service offensive to
the laws of foreign nations. For the repercussions of such mistakes, see supra notes
78-81.
127. Yet, this is one of the most important goals of the Hague Service Convention.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
128. Supra notes 26, 42.
129. Compare supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text with supra notes 91-99 and
accompanying text.
130. See supra note 8 1.
131. Supra note 78.
132. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, § 401, Pub. L. No.
100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)).
133. Judicial Improvements Act, § 401(b), Pub. L. No. 100-702 (1988) (emphasis
added).
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thereto.13 4 The Federal Rules, however, are superseded by subse-
quently enacted statutes clearly inconsistent with the Federal Rules,
"unless the rule-making power is later augmented so that it in turn may
supersede the statute."' 135 Statutes that are not clearly inconsistent
should be harmonized with the Federal Rules. t36 These methods of
resolving conflicts under the REA should apply to the Hague Service
Convention because such a self-executing treaty has the same force and
effect as a federal statute.'
3 7
Under the REA, the Hague Service Convention would not super-
sede or preempt the more flexible scheme of FRCP 4(i), despite the
insistence by some federal courts that the Convention supersedes FRCP
4(i) because the specific terms of the Convention control the more gen-
eral provisions of FRCP 4(i).' 3 8 First, assuming that the Convention
and FRCP 4(i) are not clearly inconsistent, reading the Convention to be
the exclusive source of service procedure does not harmonize Rule 4(i)
and the Convention because such a reading completely sacrifices the flex-
ibile scheme and ad hoc approach intended by Congress under FRCP
4(i); exclusive use of the Convention decreases the freedom that parties
and courts have for tailoring a method of service to meet particular exi-
gencies, which is especially troublesome where the Convention proves
ineffective because of some oversight on the part of the drafters. As this
Note will argue, a rule of first resort is a more effective approach for
satisfying American obligations under the Convention and for ensuring
the flexibility under Rule 4(i). Second, even if Rule 4(i) and the Hague
Service Convention were clearly inconsistent, Rule 4(i) would nonethe-
less supersede the Convention, which has been in force since 1969,
because the rule-making power was exercised later in 1983 through an
amendment to Rule 4.139
134. 2J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1.02[5] (2d ed. 1988). See Griffith
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 545 F.2d 1194, 1197 n.3 (9th Cir. 1976) (conflict between 28 U.S.C.
§ 2107 and FED. R. App. P. 4), cert. den. 434 U.S. 854 (1976).
135. 2 J. MOORE, supra note 134.
136. 3J. PALMER, Cyc. FED. PROC. § 8.02 n.3 (3d ed. 1985).
137. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the Constitution a
treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legis-
lation"); Smith v. Dainichi Kinzoku Kogyo Co., 680 F. Supp. 847, 850 n.1 (W.D. Tex.
1988) (Hague Service Convention is self-executing).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 115-21.
139. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
462, 96 Stat. 2527 (1983). This, however, is a weak argument because FRCP 4(i) was
not amended by the 1983 Amendments. Plaintiffs nonetheless took this position in
Harris v. Browning-Ferris Industries, 10 F.R.D. 775 (D. La. 1984), but were rebuffed
by the court on the grounds that the more specific terms of the Convention control
over the more general provisions of FRCP 4(i). However, the REA was not raised by
either the court or the plaintiffs and therefore did not enter into consideration of the
issue. The last in time analysis adopted by the court in I'orliees, discussed supra, at text
accompanying notes 109-14, which resulted in application of the Convention rather
than FRCP 4(i), is not inconsistent with the position posed by this Note under the
REA because the case predated the 1983 Amendments to FRCP 4.
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Moreover, from a practical perspective, reading the Convention as
merely permissive authority in all cases would place greater hardship on
American parties serving abroad. Such an approach only offers answers
about sufficiency of service after already attempting service, thereby
making the appropriate method of service unpredictable and encourag-
ing protracted disputes to decide whether service is insufficient. An ad
hoc approach also makes the litigant's job much more difficult by permit-
ting each federal district to approach the interplay between FRCP 4(i)
and the Convention with different balancing techniques 140 or different
results.
Finally, a supplementary approach may treat parties unequally.
Both federal and state courts have held that the Convention supersedes
state law under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause. 14 1 By interpret-
ing the Convention as a permissive supplement, however, federal courts
could permit service by mail under FRCP 4 in foreign nations objecting
to this method under- Article 21, whereas state courts, bound by the
Convention, could not permit such service.
This is the sort of unequal treatment that federal courts have
shunned when discussing forum shopping and discrimination between
similarly situated parties. Requiring exclusive use of the Convention in
state court but treating the Convention as a permissive supplement in
federal court treats similarly situated parties differently in identical liti-
gation. A party serving by mail in state court may face dismissal under
the Convention for ineffective service while a plaintiff suing the same
foreign party in federal court could effect service through FRCP 4(i)
without resorting to the Convention. These are the sorts of problems
that federal courts should avoid rather than intensify when deciding
which law governs. 14 2
3. Both Approaches Articulated by Federal Courts Fail to Satisfy the Goals of
the Hague Service Convention
Both approaches articulated by the federal judiciary are inadequate
because they fail to represent accurately the meaning of the Convention.
Before delving into the specific reasons for the failure of both
approaches, however, it is necessary to examine the language and pur-
pose of the Convention.
140. The Supreme Court opened the floodgates for varying and inconsistent bal-
ancing techniques among different federal courts with respect to the Hague Evidence
Convention when it stated that "we do not articulate specific rules to guide this deli-
cate task of adjudication." Sociek'.Vationale, 107 S.Ct. at 2557.
141. See Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, 654 F.2d 280, 288-89 (3d Cir. 1981)
("By virtue of the supremacy clause, the treaty overrides state methods of serving
process abroad that are objectionable to the nation in which the process is served").
See also supra notes 83-86, 100-23 and accompanying text.
142. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73-75 (1938) (discussion of forum
shopping and discrimination evils).
116l.22
1989 Hague Service Convention
a. Obligatory Nature of the Convention: An Excursus into Language
and Purpose
The language and drafting history of the Hague Service Convention
indicate that the Convention is mandatory authority in the courts of sig-
natory nations. First, the Convention uses obligatory rather than per-
missive language. According to Article 1, the Hague Service
Convention "shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial mat-
ters.... ,"143 The Conference's use of mandatory language in the Hague
Service Convention is significant given the Conference's use of permis-
sive language in the Hague Evidence Convention.' 44
Second, Article 19 of the Convention, inserted at the request of the
United States, seems to prohibit, by negative implication, a plaintiff's
use of its own country's broader domestic service provisions rather than
the Convention to effect service upon a foreigner:
To the extent that the internal law of a contracting State permits methods
of transmission, other than those provided for in the preceding articles, of
documents coming from abroad, for service within its territory, the present Con-
vention shall not affect such provisions. 14 5
Article 19 basically provides that the Convention does not prohibit a
foreign plaintiff from using state or federal domestic service procedures
broader than the Convention when serving an American in the United
States, but does not provide that an American can use domestic provi-
sions broader than the Convention to serve a defendant from another
country. The service documents are not "coming from abroad" and will
not effect service "within its [the American's] territory."
Third, the history of the Hague Service Convention's drafting indi-
cates that the Conference changed its intention from permissive to
mandatory authority. Though the Conference indicated that the "Con-
vention establishes more of a freedom than an obligation" in its explan-
atory report to the first draft, 14 6 the delegates made certain revisions
143. Service Convention, supra note 42, at art. 1 (emphasis added).
144. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, Preamble, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 2557, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847
U.N.T.S. 231 (preamble speaks in permissive terms by stating that the purpose of the
Hague Evidence Convention is to "facilitate" and "improve" discovery involving for-
eign parties). Article 1 of the Convention also contains permissive language: ". . .a
judicial authority . . . may . . . request the competent authority of another
[c]ontracting [s]tate, by means of a Letter of Request, to obtain evidence." Id. at art.
1 (emphasis added). For an analysis of this contrast, see Societi Nationale, 107 S.Ct.
2542, 2550-51 n.15 (1987) (Hague Conference consciously distinguished between
mandatory and permissive language in drafting conventions).
145. Service Convention, supra note 42, at art. 19.
146. 1 B. RIsTAu, supra note 32, at § 4-10. At the time of the first draft, the dele-
gates felt that it was "extreme to impose an obligation to follow the Convention
route in every case where the person to be served was in a foreign country." Id.
Moreover, "it was thought that it was up to the law of the forum state to prescribe
under what circumstances resort should be made to the Convention... it would not
be proper ... to limit ... the judge." Id. In effect, "the Convention needs to be
applied by a contracting state only if the law of that state says so." Id.
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during the plenary session "to make it clear that the Convention
machinery must be employed in all cases where service abroad is
sought." 14 7
Yet, where the Convention will not work because of a drafting over-
sight or because the procedures are not equipped to effect timely service
in a particular situation, it is not clear that the Convention would pro-
hibit the use of broader state or federal procedures by an American
upon a foreigner. Though the language and drafting history of the Con-
vention suggest that the Convention is obligatory, the broader purposes
of the Convention strongly suggest that the Convention would permit
resort to domestic service provisions where the Convention would not
effect service and thereby deprive a plaintiff of the ability to sue.
The purpose of the Convention is "to ensure that judicial and extra-
judicial documents to be served abroad shall be brought to the notice of
the addressee in sufficient time."' 148 The procedures of the Convention
are intended "to improve the organization of mutual judicial assistance
for that purpose by simplifying and expediting the procedure." 149 Requir-
ing strict adherence to the Convention even where timely and adequate
notice could not be accomplished under its procedures would not
advance the objective to facilitate international litigation in an environ-
ment of mutual judicial assistance.
Moreover, despite the language of the Convention, language and
drafting history are not the only sources aiding interpretation of treaties
under United States law. United States courts must consider the Sen-
ate's understanding of a treaty or convention, as revealed by committee
reports, debates and other sources of legislative history.' 5 0 In ratifying
the Convention, the Senate was sensitive to the need of protecting the
due process rights of American citizens involved in international litiga-
tion.15 1 It is implausible to suggest that the Senate could have been so
concerned about the posture of American citizens in international litiga-
tion, and yet could have ratified a Convention which would deprive an
American plaintiff of the ability to initiate a lawsuit where the plaintiff
could not effect service because of inadequate Convention procedures.
The Senate also believed that the Convention was consistent with
the spirit of the laws in force at the time, such as FRCP 4(i), which guar-
147. Id. At the time of the final draft, the delegates concluded that "the Conven-
tion machinery is obligatory" and "where a contracting state formally objects to any
manner of service ... the conventional route becomes the exclusive method of ser-
vice in that state." Id.
148. Service Convention, supra note 42, at Preamble.
149. Id.
150. For a discussion of the need to consider the Senate's understanding of the
meaning of a treaty or convention, see infra note 154.
151. S. EXEc. REP. No. 6, supra note 4, at 3, 9 ("[The Convention] will provide
increased protection (due process) for American citizens who are involved in litiga-
tion abroad") ("[The Convention] gives to our people, whether litigating rights in
State or Federal courts, a very useful tool in furthering a fair determination of their
rights").
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anteed flexibility to meet the special exigencies of serving abroad. 15 2
Thus, an obligatory Convention which required strict adherence regard-
less of the circumstances could not have been envisioned by the Senate.
The Senate's understanding is in fact consistent with the object and
purpose of the Convention, two other important indicia of treaty mean-
ing. The Convention is aimed at facilitating expeditious service, guaran-
teeing enforceable judgments and decreasing the number of default
judgments.153 The drafters of the Convention, however, could not have
foreseen every problem that would impede service abroad and enforcea-
ble judgments. Situations therefore will arise where the provisions of
the Convention will not facilitate effective service and will fail to guaran-
tee an enforceable judgment. Permitting resort to other service proce-
dures ensures that domestic law can be used to fill gaps in the
Convention and thereby guarantee enforceable judgments free from
collateral attack in situations not adequately addressed by the Conven-
tion's drafters.
b. Problems with Reading the Convention as Mandatory Authority in
All Cases
United States courts and the Executive Branch must give effect to the
Senate's understanding of a treaty or convention.15 4 A reading of the
Hague Service Convention which mandates exclusive resort to the Con-
vention, however, is not consistent with the Senate's understanding at
the time of ratification that Americans must receive generous protec-
tions in the context of international litigation and that the Convention
would provide flexibility similar to existing U.S. law. 155 Thus, interpret-
ing the Convention as an exclusive source of service procedure violates
the standard of judicial deference to Senate understanding and thereby
raises serious separation of powers questions.
Moreover, reading the Convention as an exclusive source of service
procedure is not necessarily consistent with the Convention's object and
purpose. The Hague Conference drafted and adopted the Hague Ser-
vice Convention to facilitate expeditious service and reduce the number
of default judgments in some other foreign court. 156 Thus, the Conven-
tion's main goal is to ensure that the complexities of service abroad do
not impede fair and efficient litigation among parties from different
nations. Yet, interpreting the Convention to preclude resort to any
other provisions which grant broader and more generous service would
152. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 6, supra note 4, at 7 (based on a statement from the
Judicial Conference of the United States).
153. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
154. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 314, comment d, § 325
n.5 ("A court or agency of the United States is required to take into account United
States materials relating to the formation of an international agreement . . ."). See
also id. at § 326 comment a ("... understandings expressed by the Senate in giving its
advice and consent must be respected").
155. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
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not advance the successful and simple resolution of international litiga-
tion in cases where the Convention's procedures do not effect timely
and adequate service because of some oversight on the part of the
Hague Conference.
c. Problems with Interpreting the Convention as Merely
Supplementary
Reading the Convention as permissive or supplementary, regardless of
whether the Convention's provisions are capable of effecting service,
violates the language and purpose of the Convention. The Conven-
tion's preamble makes two important statements. First, the Convention
must be applied when serving abroad. Second, the purpose of the Con-
vention is to facilitate the resolution of international litigation free from
collateral attack. At the very least, therefore, the Convention must be
used where its procedures will effect adequate service which will enable
a plaintiff to initiate international litigation and ultimately to obtain an
enforceable judgment. Reading the Convention as a mere supplement
to domestic law ignores this strong presumption of use. Similarly, inter-
preting the Hague Service Convention as permissive, and thereby frus-
trating the goals of the Convention, may ultimately be a disservice to
litigants. The Convention's drafters sought to prescribe means of ser-
vice which would avoid default judgments and withstand collateral
attack in enforcement suits.' 5 7
The Senate also sought to ensure that American citizens receive
adequate protection when suing or being sued in foreign courts. 158
Labelling the Convention as "permissive" may give American plaintiffs
the false impression that they can ignore the provisions of the Conven-
tion and still enforce judgments abroad. Moreover, if the United States
is unwilling to comply with the Convention, it is less likely that foreign
jurisdictions will be enthusiastic about providing American citizens with
the utmost cooperation and protection.
Ill. Adopting a "Rule of First Resort" to Deal with Confusion Regarding
the Interplay Between FRCP 4(i) and the Hague Service
Convention
To remedy confusion regarding the interplay between FRCP 4(i) and
the Hague Service Convention, the United States should institute a
"rule of first resort", an approach adopted by the concurrence in Societl
Nationale v. U.S. Dist. Ct., S. D. Iowa,15 9 to deal with a related conflict
between federal discovery rules and the Hague Evidence Convention.
Under this approach, the plaintiff first must attempt to serve under the
157. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
159. 107 S.Ct. 2542 (1987). This approach arguably was adopted by at least one
federal district court. Cooper v. Makita, Civ. No. 87-0053-P, slip op. (D. Me. Sept.
24, 1987) (unpublished).
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Hague Service Convention before resorting to more flexible and per-
missive domestic service procedures.
Societi Nationale and the concurring opinion therein are useful for
discussing the interplay between FRCP 4(i) and the Hague Service Con-
vention because Societ6 addressed an identical issue in a different con-
text: how should American courts reconcile conflicts between a federal
rule and a self-executing treaty to which the United States is a party?
This Note, however, does not attempt to argue that the concurring Jus-
tices in Societ6 would apply the rule of first resort in the service context.
In fact, there is no reason to believe that the concurrence disagreed with
the majority's suggestion in dictum that the Hague Service Convention
may be the exclusive mechanism for serving foreign parties located in
signatory nations. This Note nonetheless contends that the rule of first
resort is the appropriate approach in the service context for the reasons
stated in Part III-B.
A. Societi Nationale-Background and Discussion
In SocietiNationale the United States Supreme Court addressed the inter-
play between the Federal Rules relating to discovery and the Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters 160 adopted by the United States 16 1 and sixteen other
countries. 16 2
American plaintiffs to the original action ("Plaintiffs") purchased an
aircraft designed, manufactured and marketed by a French corporation
("Petitioner"). 163 The plane crashed in Iowa, and Plaintiffs sued Peti-
tioner for negligence and breach of warranty.' 64
Plaintiffs initiated discovery under FRCP 34(b) and 36 by request-
ing the production of documents and certain admissions. 165 Though
Petitioner complied with these requests, 166 it sought a protective order
when Plaintiffs delivered a second request for the production of docu-
ments under FRCP 34, answers to interrogatories under FRCP 33, and
admissions under FRCP 36.167 Petitioner argued that the Hague Evi-
dence Convention rather than the Federal Rules exclusively applied to
the pretrial discovery procedures because (1) Petitioner was a corpora-
tion based in a nation that signed the Evidence Convention, and (2) the
160. Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 [hereinafter "Evidence
Convention"].
161. Ratified by the U.S. Senate unanimously in 1972. 118 CONG. REC. 20,623
(1972).
162. OFFICE OF LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 261-62
(1986) (Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Israel, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, France, West Ger-
many, and the United Kingdom).
163. Sociel6Xationale, 107 S.Ct. at 2546.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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requested discovery material was found in France. 16 8
The Supreme Court considered the following issue: to what extent
must a federal district court employ the procedures set forth in the
Hague Evidence Convention when domestic litigants seek answers to
interrogatories, production of documents and admissions from a foreign
adversary? The Court began its analysis by outlining four possible
approaches. First, the Evidence Convention could serve as mandatory
authority, i.e., to be used exclusively whenever evidence located abroad
is sought for use in American courts. 169 Second, the Court could adopt
a rule of "first use", i.e., look to the Convention first, and resort to the
Federal Rules only if the Convention proves unproductive or futile.' 70
These first two approaches are formalistic because they are predicated
upon the existence of and adherence to a treaty obligation. 17 1 Third,
the Court could view the Convention as supplementary and optional,
"to which concerns of comity nevertheless require first resort by Ameri-
can courts in all cases." 172 This approach views the Evidence Conven-
tion as supplementary, but also anticipates an analysis which ultimately
requires first using the Convention Rules, given the interest in interna-
tional cooperation and convenience. Fourth, the Court could invoke an
ad hoc balancing approach. Under this approach, the Convention's pur-
pose is merely to facilitate discovery.1 73 Thus, a court should only use
the Convention when "appropriate," i.e., when the situation of the par-
ties, interest of the United States, and interest of the foreign state war-
rant application of the Evidence Convention Rules. 174
The Court ultimately adopted the fourth approach, concluding that
the Evidence Convention is a permissive supplement rather than a pre-
emptive replacement of the Federal Rules intended to establish optional
procedures for facilitating the collection of evidence abroad.175 Thus,
the Court rejected the extreme approach that the Evidence Convention
is either exclusive (as suggested by Petitioner at the District Court) or
inapplicable when jurisdiction exists (as held by the Eighth Circuit).
Justice Blackmun authored a separate opinion joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor which disagreed with the majority's
reasoning and which proposed a rule of first resort, thereby establishing
a general presumption that courts must first resort to the Evidence Con-
vention. 176 Only if there is a strong indication that the Convention is
unproductive or futile in a particular case should the court engage in an
individualized interest analysis. 177
168. Societe.Nationale, 107 S. Ct. at 2546.
169. Id. at 2550.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Societi.Vationale, 107 S. Ct. at 2550.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2554-55.
176. Id. at 2558.
177. Id.
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The four justices disagreed with the majority for several reasons.
First, courts are neither equipped nor empowered to engage in the com-
ity analysis required by the majority's ad hoc balancing approach. 17 8
Courts are not equipped to engage in a neutral balancing of foreign
interests because very few American judges understand foreign legal
systems, realize what actions will offend foreign sovereigns, or deal fre-
quently with the intricacies of transnational litigation.' 79 Moreover,
given that the Convention represents a balance of interests already
determined by the Legislative and Executive Branches of government, it
would offend the Constitution's separation of powers for a court to
ignore the political determination embodied by the Convention and
engraft its own vision of the national interest.18 0 Second, Justice Black-
mun argued that the majority failed to acknowledge adequately the
international obligations undertaken by the United States in ratifying
the Convention' 8 and clearly dictated by the legislative history of the
Convention. 18 2 Third, it is in the interest of the United States to comply
with the Convention.' 83 Fourth, even if courts engaged in case-by-case
interest analysis as prescribed by the majority, this analysis should lead
courts to use the Evidence Convention.
184
B. Applying the Rule of First Resort to the Service Context
The rule of first resort adopted in Justice Blackmun's opinion would
work well in the service context. A rule of first resort satisfies the pur-
poses of both the Convention and FRCP 4(i) as well as the goals under-
lying the principle of international comity.
1. The Rule of First Resort Would Satisfy the Purposes of the Convention and
FRCP 4(i)
A rule of first resort is consistent with the purposes underlying both the
Convention and FRCP 4(i). The approach departs from the Convention
only when reading the Convention as mandatory authority would cir-
178. Socie iNationale, 107 S. Ct. at 2558, 2560.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2558-59.
182. Id. at 2559.
183. Id. These interests include "channels for discovery abroad that would not be
available otherwise .... helping to further and to maintain the climate of cooperation
and goodwill necessary to the functioning of the international legal and commercial
systems." Id.
184. Id. at 2562 ("Although this analysis is unnecessary in the absence of any con-
flicts, it should lead courts to the use of the Convention if they recognize that the
Convention already has largely accommodated all three categories of interests rele-
vant to a comity analysis-foreign interests, domestic interests, and the interest in a
well-functioning international order"). Foreign interests include the sovereign inter-
ests of foreign nations. Id. at 2562-63. United States interests include "providing
effective procedures to enable litigants to obtain evidence abroad" and "fair and
equal treatment of litigants." Id. at 2564-67. The interest in a well-functioning inter-
national legal order includes "predictability, fairness, ease of commercial interac-
tions, and 'stability through satisfaction of mutual expectations.' " Id. at 2568.
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cumvent or fail to advance the purposes of the Convention. Moreover,
by creating a presumption that the Convention prescribes the appropri-
ate manner of service, the rule of first resort offers a simple, reliable,
and predictable approach for serving foreign parties in the vast majority
of cases.1 8 5
A supplementary approach does not leave parties with any uniform
standards from which ex ante determinations can be made about the
force and effect that the Convention will have in a particular case. In the
case of a rule of first resort with a strong presumption of use, however,
parties will know that the Convention applies absent some objective
inability to serve under the Convention. Moreover, unlike a rule of first
resort which, by virtue of the strong presumption of use, has already
incorporated a balance of interests, a supplementary approach provides
courts with absolutely no guidance about various interests and therefore
requires each court to engage in a de novo analysis of the interests of
parties, the United States, and foreign nations. Courts are not equipped
to make routinely the foreign policy judgments that would enter into
such a balance. Permitting courts to engage in ad hoc balancing analyses
without any guiding principle would not guarantee the unitary approach
sought by the Senate in ratifying the Convention.
A strong presumption of first use also acknowledges the existence
of a treaty obligation, and thereby maintains the spirit of cooperation
with foreign nations mandated by the Convention. 186 Yet, by permit-
ting resort to more generous domestic service provisions where the
plaintiff can prove that Convention procedures will fail to effect timely
and adequate notice through no fault of plaintiff's litigation strategy, the
rule of first resort also correctly acknowledges the need for flexibility in
American courts.18 7
Flexibility not only represents the overall objective of FRCP 4(i),
but also advances the Convention's objectives by providing additional
maneuverability to avoid unenforceable judgments in cases inadequately
handled by the Convention's procedures. Such flexibility does not deny
the existence of a treaty obligation or disregard the procedures of for-
eign nations. First, the use of more generous procedures for service
beyond the Convention's provisions can in fact advance international
judicial cooperation by facilitating international litigation which,
because of the ineffectiveness of the Convention in a particular case,
would not otherwise come to fruition. Second, it is inappropriate to
presuppose that departing from Convention procedures will lead to an
insensitivity to the laws of foreign nations. In framing a method of ser-
vice outside of the Convention, a court should remain sensitive to a for-
185. These are important goals of the Convention. See supra note 41 and accompa-
nying text.
186. Id. This also is an important goal of the Convention. See supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
187. Flexibility is an important purpose underlying FRCP 4(i). See supra note 26
and accompanying text.
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eign sovereign's law in order to ensure that the judgment will be
enforceable in the foreign nation if necessary. Thus, the rule of first
resort preserves the cooperation and accommodation vital under the
Convention as well as the flexibility characteristic of FRCP 4(i).
The rule of first resort accommodates both the Hague Conference's
intentions and the Senate's understanding of the Convention. Such an
approach would accommodate the Hague Conference's intention that
the Convention obligate the courts of all signatory nations ls8 because
the presumption of use articulated by a rule of first resort acknowledges
the international treaty obligations which accompanied ratification of
the Convention. 189
This approach also would comport with the Senate's understanding
that the Convention would not abrogate FRCP 4 and would not pre-
clude the use of more generous service procedures in the future.' 9 0
The rule of first resort does not imply that the Convention supersedes
FRCP 4(i). Rather, as the Senate intended, a rule of first resort would
permit the two service provisions to work together in providing a variety
of permissible service methods where domestic law provided more lib-
eral procedures than the Convention, which is especially vital where the
Convention does not adequately address particular service problems.
The rule of first resort preserves the flexibility and independence of
American courts by permitting departure from the Convention where
the Convention's methods fail to effect timely and adequate notice. The
rule of first resort, however, can embrace a presumption of use strong
enough to preserve comity and uniformity under the Convention. The
party seeking to depart from the Convention, for instance, could be
required to prove that, by no fault of its own, the Convention would not
effect adequate and timely notice. 19 1 Such a stringent approach would
minimize the likelihood of offending foreign nations in a manner which
would jeopardize the international judicial cooperation intended by the
Convention.
2. The Rule of First Resort Satisfies the Goals of International Comity
Comity "refers to the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal
approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of
other sovereign states."' 9 2 It is "neither a matter of absolute obliga-
tion, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the
other." 19 3 Rather than "a vague political concern,"' 94 comity encour-
188. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
189. See SocietE Nationale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. S.D. Iowa, 107 S.Ct. 2542, 2550 (1987).
190. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
191. Under this formulation, a party would have to show that the Convention does
not adequately address exigencies of the particular case and that litigation strategy
such as the filing of the case close to the tolling of the statute of limitations was not
the cause of the Convention's ineffectiveness.
192. See Societ.Vationale, 107 S.Ct. at 2555 n.27.
193. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (foreign judgment as prima
facie evidence unless party shows special grounds for impeachment).
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ages tolerance, goodwill, and vital cooperation among foreign
nations.' 95 Comity requires "due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of ... citizens or of other persons who
are under the protection of ... laws.'
' 9 6
The principle of comity defies any sort of mechanical application or
approach.' 97 However, courts and commentators typically assess for-
eign interests,198 domestic interests,1 99 the interest in a smoothly func-
tioning international legal order,200 and the extent of the hardship to
affected parties. 20 '
The rule of first resort would be consistent with the interest in inter-
national comity if applied to the service context. First, the rule of first
resort substantially preserves the sovereignty of other foreign nations
without entirely sacrificing an American plaintiff's ability to hail foreign
defendants into American courts. By following the procedures and
objections enumerated in the Convention, except where such provisions
fail to satisfy the general objectives and purposes of the Convention in
providing adequate notice and facilitating international litigation, Amer-
ican courts would be acknowledging the United States's obligation
under the Convention to respect a foreign nation's authority to regulate
service upon its citizens. The rule of first resort, by recognizing the
existence of a treaty obligation, respects the perception of some nations
that service within their boundaries is a sovereign act that other coun-
tries cannot exercise freely. 20 2 Moreover, it is important to note that
departing from the provisions of the Convention does not automatically
offend the sovereignty of foreign nations; an alternative method of ser-
vice tailored by a court for a particular case certainly could, and in fact
should, take into account the foreign sovereign's internal laws. In fact, a
court which ignored such foreign internal law would not be satisfying
the Convention's goal of ensuring enforceable judgments in foreign
jurisdictions.
Second, the rule of first resort advances United States interests.
American courts would be able to protect American litigants who have
194. SocieteNationale, 107 S.Ct. at 2561 (BlackmunJ., dissenting in part).
195. Id. See also S & S Screw Machine Co. v. Cosa Corp., 647 F. Supp. 600, 615
(M.D. Tenn. 1986) (applies rule of first resort to Hague Evidence Convention).
196. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164.
197. See Societe Nationale, 107 S.Ct. at 2555 n.28; S & S Screw Machine Co., 647 F.
Supp. at 615 ("comity resists mechanical formulae").
198. See Societ' Nationale, 107 S.Ct. at 2555-56, 2562; S &S Sreu,' Machine Co., 647 F.
Supp. at 616 n.31; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 40 (1965).
199. See Societe'Nationale, 107 S.Ct. at 2562, 2564-67; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 197, at § 40.
200. See SocieteNationale, 107 S.Ct. at 2562, 2567-68.
201. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 198, at § 40 (1965).
202. See Smit, supra note 78, at 1040 ("the opposition of foreign countries to the
making of service within their borders ordinarily stems from the notion that the mak-
ing of service is the official act of a foreign sovereign and should not be counte-
nanced in the absence of treaty").
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attempted to serve under the Hague Service Convention but, because of
an oversight on the part of the Hague Conference or peculiar exigen-
cies, were unsuccessful in effecting service. Moreover, unlike the cur-
rent confusion which leads to the unequal treatment of similarly situated
parties, adopting a rule of first resort would finally ensure uniform appli-
cation of the Convention. By adopting an amendment to the Federal
Rules that would incorporate this rule of first resort, all federal courts
would apply the Convention consistently. Moreover, in adopting such
an amendment, the Supreme Court would be rendering an interpreta-
tion of the Convention binding on state courts as well.
20 3
Third, a rule of first resort satisfies international comity by fostering
a smoothly functioning international legal system. The rule of first
resort provides predictability, reliability, and fairness to similarly situ-
ated parties by demonstrating that the Convention is the primary source
of service procedures, rebutted only after meeting a substantial burden
of proof. Moreover, the rule of first resort advances the functioning of
the international legal system by permitting flexibility in situations inad-
equately addressed by the Convention; such a gap-filling function, if
sensitive to a foreign sovereign's laws, can reduce the likelihood of
unenforceable judgments and time-consuming collateral attacks. 20 4 A
rule of first resort would not frustrate the expectations of other signa-
tory nations because it guarantees compliance except in the most
extraordinary situations.
IV. Amending the Federal Rules to Establish an Interplay Between
Domestic Service Provisions and the Hague Service Convention
An amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure incorporating
the Convention by reference to a rule of first resort would efficiently and
equitably resolve the interplay between domestic and international ser-
vice rules.
In 1984, the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, in an effort to harmonize the Federal Rules and the Convention,
proposed an amendment to FRCP 4(i). 20 5 The amendment would have
added a new clause permitting service "pursuant to any applicable treaty
or convention. '20 6 The accompanying notes indicated that "to the
extent that the procedures set out in the Hague Convention... conflict
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, subdivision (i)(1)(E) harmo-
203. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 154, at § 326 comment d ("An interna-
tional agreement to which the United States is a party is the supreme law of the land
.... The interpretation of such an agreement, therefore, is a matter of federal law
and binding on the courts of the several states").
204. See, e.g., S & S Screw Mach. Co., 647 F.Supp. at 618 ("The proposed approach
would provide greater predictability to the litigants, thus manifesting a 'greater sensi-
tivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the res-
olution of disputes .. '").
205. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) Supplementary Practice Commentary-1985 C4-34
(U.S.C.A. Supp. 1988).
206. Id.
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nizes them." 20 7 This proposal, however, would have failed to harmo-
nize the Convention and domestic service provisions. Instead, it would
have had just the opposite effect. The proposal suggested that the Con-
vention is a permissive supplement to the five other methods already
enumerated in FRCP 4(i). Furthermore, merely appending the proposal
to the already existing 4(i) methods could give practitioners the impres-
sion that the other methods of service are available notwithstanding the
Convention. 20 8
To avoid this additional confusion, the Advisory Committee should
propose, and the Standing Committee on Rules and Procedures should
adopt, an amendment to FRCP 4(i) prescribing first resort to the Con-
vention where a plaintiff attempts to effect service in a signatory nation:
Rule 4(i). [Alternative] Provisions for Service in a Foreign Country.
(1) Manner of service when serving in aforeign country which is
a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad ofJudicial
and Extrajudicial Documents. Whenever a statute of the United States
or an order of court thereunder provides for service of a summons, or of a
notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant
of orfound within the state in which the district court is held, and service
is to be effected upon the party in aforeign country which is a signatoy to
the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad ofJudicial and Extrajudi-
cial Documents, the party wishing to effect service shall comply with the
terms of the Hague Convention. If after having attempted service under
the Convention or after having inquired of a central authority as to the
amount of time needed for approval of a service request, a party wishing
to serve abroad demonstrates that timely service reasonably calculated to
give notice is not possible under the Convention because (i) the Conven-
tion could not have effected timely service even where Convention proce-
dures were initiated 30 days after commencement of the applicable statute
of limitations period or (ii) none of the methods of service permissible
under the Convention or found under the foreign signatory's internal law
are reasonably calculated to secure delivery of notice or of a summons,
then the party wishing to effect service may serve: (A) by verifiable mail
as defined by subdivision (3) so long as there is no specific reservation to
delivery via postal channels by the signatory nation in which the party to
be served is located or (B) in a manner directed by order of court.
(2) Alternative Methods of Service when serving in aforeign coun-
try which is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Service
Abroad ofJudicial and Extrajudicial Documents. When the federal
or state law referred to in subdivision (e) of this rule authorizes
service upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the
state in which the district court is held, and service is to be
effected upon the party in a foreign country which is not a signa-
tory to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents, in addition to the methods permitted under
subdivision (e) of this rule, it is also sufficient if service of the sum-
mons and complaint is made: (A) in the manner prescribed by
the law of the foreign country for service in that country in an
207. Id.
208. Id. See also National Law Journal, Feb. 4, 1985, at 28.
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action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or (B) as
directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter roga-
tory, when service in either case is reasonably calculated to
give actual notice; or (C) upon an individual, by delivery to the
individual personally, and upon a corporation or partnership
or association, by delivery to an officer, a managing or general
agent; or (D) by any form of verifiable mail, requiring a signed
receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the
court, or (E) as directed by order of the court.
(3) Service by verifiable mail: (A) Service by mail under subdi-
visions (1)(A) and (2) may be made by any person who is not a
party and is not less than 18 years of age or who is designated
by order of the district court or by the foreign court. On
request, the clerk shall deliver the summons to the plaintiff for
transmission to the person or the foreign court or officer who
will make the service. [(2)] (B) Return. Proof of service may be
made as prescribed by subdivision (g) of this rule, or by the law
of the foreign country, or by order of the court. Proof of ser-
vice by mail shall include a receipt signed by the addressee or
other evidence of delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the
court.
Rule 4(e). Summons: Service upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found
Within State.
Except in cases covered by subdivision 4(i)(1), dealing with manner of
service in a foreign country which is a signatory to the Hague Conven-
tion on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents,
whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court
thereunder provides for service of a summons, or of a notice,
or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabit-
ant of or found within the state in which the district court is
held, service may be made under the circumstances and in the
manner prescribed by the statute or order, or, if there is no
provision therein prescribing the manner of service, in a man-
ner stated in this rule. Whenever a statute or rule of court of
the state in which the district court is held provides (1) for
service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of
summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within
the state, or (2) for service upon or notice to such a party to
appear and respond or defend in an action by reason of the
attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of the party's
property located within the state, service may in either case be
made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed
in the statute or rule.2 09
209. Italicized material indicates additions and bracketed material indicates dele-
tions. The Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has in fact
proposed a similar amendment. See Proposed Amendment to Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (Dec. 10, 1988) (filed in Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Washington, D.C.).
The proposal set forth in this Note, however, is different in two respects. First,
unlike the amendment proposed by the Advisory Committee, this Note recommends
that foreign service provisions remain neatly divided under FRCP 4(i). The 1963
drafters created a separate section for foreign service to underscore or "amplify" the
special considerations that must be taken into account when serving abroad. FED. R.
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This proposal has several important features. First, it follows the
1963 drafters' intention to amplify the special complexities surrounding
service in a foreign country by placing all matters relating to service in a
foreign country within one clearly marked section.
Second, the proposal establishes a strong presumption that the
Hague Service Convention applies when serving a party located in a sig-
natory nation. To challenge this presumption, the party wishing to
effect service must either have attempted service under the Convention
or inquired into the amount of time needed for a Central Authority to
act on a service request. Requiring attempted service under the Con-
vention or a documented inquiry to a Central Authority not only estab-
lishes a party's good faith in attempting to comply with the Convention,
but also provides objective evidence for the court to determine whether
service under the Convention is in fact not possible. A party can only
rebut the presumption of first use if it demonstrates that service is not
CiV. PROC. 4(i) (advisory committee note of 1963). Merely tacking foreign service
provisions onto some other Rule 4 subdivision would not highlight these special con-
siderations. Moreover, the proposal set forth in this Note reduces confusion by
retaining the current structure of Rule 4-practitioners and the bench would not
have to contend with structural revisions upsetting the interplay between subdivi-
sions with which the legal community has been acquainted for over two decades.
Moreover, the proposal set forth in this Note neatly divides service methods pertain-
ing to signatory and non-signatory nations, thereby underscoring the impact of the
United States treaty obligation.
Second, unlike the Advisory Committee's version, the proposal advanced by this
Note provides a different focus on the respect to be accorded to the methods of
delivery available under the Convention. Unlike this Note, the Advisory Committee
Proposal seems to sacrifice the Central Authority system, which, in some cases, will
not guarantee effective service, for an escape provision guaranteeing that every
American will be able to serve abroad. The Advisory Committee's proposal permits
resort to non-Convention sources when six months have lapsed from the date of
requesting action by a Central Authority and service has not yet been effected. Such
an ultimatum has the potential for offending foreign nations, particularly in light of
the short turn-around period prescribed by the Advisory Committee's proposal. For
instance, in a case where a party has requested service, and, at the end of the six-
month period, the Central Authority has rejected the party's proposed method, the
Advisory Committee approach would permit a court to order service rather than
require the party to find a method amenable to the foreign signatory. Disregarding
Central Authorities in such cases has the potential of increasing, not decreasing,
unenforceable judgments, a condition fundamentally at odds with the purpose of the
Convention. Moreover, the Advisory Committee proposal locks parties into a six-
month waiting period. Under the proposal advanced by this Note, a party can show
that the Convention will not work at any time during the litigation. This flexibility
can be particularly helpful to plaintiffs who have a short limitations period and who,
after proving that the Convention will not work, will need time to develop a strategy
for serving and to re-serve if the specially tailored strategy fails and needs to be
perfected.
Finally, a six-month period is unrealistic; the shortness of this period may render
the Convention meaningless. See Itel Container Int'l v. Atlanttrafik Exp. Serv., 686 F.
Supp. 438, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (whether service is untimely under Rule 40)) ("The
case at bar illustrates that service pursuant to the Hague Convention may be a time-
consuming process even in an English-speaking jurisdiction; more than 180 days
elapsed between the time of plaintiff's counsel's request for service in London and
counsel's receipt of the return certificate").
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possible under the Convention because the Convention's procedures
either do not provide enough time to meet the statute of limitations or
fail to offer a workable method of delivery reasonably calculated to give
notice. Subdivision (1)(i), however, ensures that the inability to satisfy
the statute of limitations is a result of Convention procedure alone, and
not the party's choice to serve later on during the limitations period.
The proposal measures the Convention's ability to meet statute of limi-
tations periods thirty days after commencement of the limitations period
so as to allow a reasonable period of time for the parties to prepare
papers and conduct research on service abroad.
Third, in the event that a party successfully rebuts the presumption
of first resort, the proposal permits service by mail so long as the foreign
country either does not object or permits a court to tailor a method of
service. This offers flexibility to the court where special exigencies exist,
and, at the same time, minimizes intrusion upon a foreign nation's sov-
ereignty. In this respect, it is important to note that under this proposal
service by mail would not be permitted where a foreign nation either
objects under the Convention or prohibits such service under its
national laws.
Fourth, subdivision 3, which is presently FRCP 4(i) in pertinent
part, is retained in order to deal with service in nations that are not sig-
natories to the Convention.
This proposal would provide a workable and equitable interplay.
Such a draft would satisfy the purposes of both the Federal Rules and
the Convention. 21 0 The proposal provides a definitive method of ser-
vice that is simple, reliable, and in the spirit of international judicial
cooperation by preserving the consistency and uniformity needed for a
smoothly functioning international legal regime. The proposal only
departs from the language of the Convention when following the Con-
vention would not satisfy the Convention's purposes. The proposal
would not treat similarly situated parties in state and federal courts dif-
ferently.2 11 Federal courts would join state courts in affirming a treaty
obligation under this approach. Only under a limited set of circum-
stances, where the plaintiff could prove a strong indication that the Con-
vention would not sufficiently effect service and the Convention or a
signatory nation fails to permit mail service under Article 10, would the
federal courts actually depart from the Convention. The rule of first
resort advances international comity by acknowledging (1) foreign
nations' interests in sovereignty and in the protection of their citizens,
(2) the United States's interest in effective service methods, and (3) the
mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly functioning international
legal regime. However, the proposal minimizes a court's need to bal-
210. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
211. In adopting this proposal, the Supreme Court would be rendering an inter-
pretation of a treaty or convention, i.e., that the Convention mandates a rule of first
resort in the United States, which is binding upon state courts. See supra note 203 and
accompanying text.
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ance interests by setting forth a presumption of adherence to the Con-
vention and then by enumerating specific standards sufficient to rebut
the presumption. At the same time, the alternative mail service provi-
sion retains the flexibility needed by American courts and envisioned by
the drafters of FRCP 4(i), so long as such mail service does not offend
the sovereignty of a foreign nation. In short, the proposal arrives at a
reasonable accommodation between the domestic and foreign laws by
requiring compliance with the Convention when it assures effective ser-
vice by American citizens on foreign parties.
Conclusion
Domestic service provisions and the Hague Service Convention occa-
sionally pose mixed signals with respect to the availability of service
abroad by mail. On the one hand, while domestic provisions often per-
mit service abroad by mail without limitation, the Hague Service Con-
vention either prohibits service by mail outright, or prohibits such mail
service where a signatory nation objects. By sending mixed signals,
these two service provisions confuse courts and practitioners attempting
to find the appropriate method of service.
Existing attempts to alleviate this confusion and to establish an
interplay are inadequate. The current judicial attempts at the lower fed-
eral court and Supreme Court levels fail to delineate a workable, uni-
form, or consistent standard, thereby generating rather than alleviating
confusion. Moreover, the 1984 Advisory Committee proposal to amend
Rule 4(i) fails to harmonize domestic and international service provi-
sions. An amendment to FRCP 4, however, which, in cases where the
Convention has proven ineffective, provides for service by verifiable
mail, or through a method developed by order of a court where mail
service violates the sovereignty of a foreign nation, satisfies both domes-
tic and international concerns. The approach minimizes American
infringement upon the sovereignty of other nations who are signatories
to the Convention. The proposal arguably fails to offend foreign
nations at all because the amendment only permits departure from the
Convention where serving under the Convention would not satisfy the
goals or purposes of the Convention. This amendment would advance
United States interests in protecting American litigants, preserve judi-
cial independence and advance the object and purposes of the Hague
Service Convention by facilitating effective service that could not other-
wise be accomplished.
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